Respect, Coercion and Religious Belief :: Religion Argumentative Argument Papers

Respect, Coercion and Religious BeliefIn this paper, I articulate and evaluate an important argument in swear of the claim that citizens of a promiscuous democracy should not support despotic policies on the basis of a rationale they know other citizens moderately reject. I conclude that that argument is unsuccessful. In particular, I argue that spiritual believers who support coercive public policies on the basis of religious convictions do not disrespect citizens who reasonably regard such religious convictions as false. ISomewhere near the heart of much contemporary liberal governmental theory is the claim that if the state restricts an agents liberty, its restrictions should have some rationale that is defensible to each of those whose liberty is constrained. Liberals ar committed to the requirement that whole aspects of the social order should either be made acceptable or be capable of being made acceptable to every cultivation individual. But there are many kinds of cl aim which are peculiarly controversial, many about which we expect reasonable disagreement. Coercive policies should not be justified on the basis of such controversial grounds rather, they should admire public justification. That coercive policy should enjoy public justification implies that political actors are subject to various principles of restraint, that is, that they should restrain themselves from supporting policies solely on the basis of excessively controversial grounds. The point of advocating restraint is to achieve a minimal moral conception, a core morality, which is ration ally acceptable to all and which provides the ground rules for political association. In what follows, I evaluate what I keep back to be the most compelling argument in support of restraint. For quiet of exposition, I shall refer to this argument as the argument from respect. What is that argument? jump an informal formulation. Suppose that John supports some policy which has important conseq uences for the well-being of a certain type of animal, say, the spotted owl. Since spotted owls can suffer, and since they are conscious of their suffering, John should take into consideration the interests of the spotted owl when find out whether or not to support logging in antiquated offshoot forests, John should include in his moral calculus the suffering generated by the devastation of the spotted owls natural habitat. Johns position regarding the propriety of logging in old growth forests doesnt just affect owls, of course it also affects loggers the likes of Mary. Mary, like John, must come to grips with the issues raised by the destruction of old growth forests.